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In the seventeenth century, William
Molyneux posed his now famous ques-
tion to John Locke, a question about the
contents of human sensory experience, the
relation between cross-modal perceptions,
and the origins of sensory content more
generally. Locke (as cited by Molyneux’s
Question, n.d.1) paraphrased Molyneux’s
Question as follows:
“Suppose a man born blind, and now
adult, and taught by his touch to distin-
guish between a Cube, and a Sphere of
the same metal, and nighly of the same
bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one
and t’other, which is the Cube, which
the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and
Sphere placed on a Table, and the Blind
Man to be made to see. Quære, whether
by his sight, before he touched them, he
could now distinguish, and tell, which
is the Globe, which the Cube (Locke,
1694/1979).”
Since then, empiricists and nativists have
argued about these issues. Empiricists,
who take all sensory content to be derived
from experience, have traditionally argued
for the negative conclusion—a blind
man would not differentiate the cube
from the sphere on first sight. Nativists,
who believe that we are born with at
least some core conceptual resources,
have often championed the positive
view: A transfer of content from hap-
tics to vision would occur, thus enabling
the blind man to differentiate between
the two shapes. Today, a burgeoning
interest in multimodal processing has
1In the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved
from http://www.iep.utm.edu/molyneux/.
again resurrected Molyneux’s Question.
Sometimes authors have identified and
addressed this set of problems by name
(Held et al., 2011; Connolly, 2013, 2014).
Other researchers raise very similar
questions but pose them in a modern
guise. They ask: How we should inter-
pret data from multimodal experiments
in the behavioral and neural sciences
(e.g., Fowler, 2004; Wallace et al., 2006;
Connolly, 2014)?
I show why the traditional answers,
“yes” by Nativist and “no” by the
Empiricist, are too simple2. Specifically,
I begin by arguing that at least two nativist
theories can predict a “no” answer to
Molyneux’s Question. I then go on to
argue that theories promoting a common
coding scheme across modalities are the
nativist accounts that predict an affirma-
tive answer. This is important as many
influential accounts of multisensory per-
ception in the field of speech recognition
and elsewhere shares these features and
should therefore be explored in light of
these issues. A framework in the field of
Psychology known as direct perception, for
instance, argues that speech and other
phenomena are recognized “directly”
as dynamic-gestural events. This is true
regardless of whether cues are obtained via
the auditory, visual, or even tactile modali-
ties (Rosenblum et al., 1997; Fowler, 2004).
Crucially, the information accessed by the
2A variety of empiricist (perceptual learning and/or
segregation of the senses) and nativist accounts
(inborn concepts, common geometrical representa-
tions; Van Cleve, 2007) have been proposed for
negative and affirmative answers respectively (cf.
Molyneux’s Question, n.d.).
perceiver is amodal and hence not tied
to a specific modality, such as the audi-
tory. I also illustrate how these issues make
predictions for theories of speech percep-
tion and our interpretation of phenomena
such as the McGurk effect (McGurk and
MacDonald, 1976). Finally, I describe how
ongoing developments in behavioral and
reaction-time methods can be used to dis-
tinguish the different nativist and empiri-
cist accounts of perception discussed in
this paper.
NATIVIST THEORIES AND
MOLYNEUX’S QUESTION
In this section, I show how at least
two nativist theories predict a negative
answer to Molyneux’s Question; I refer
to these as the Common Geometry and
Domain specific modular theory3. I then
highlight how accounts associated with
direct perception predict an affirmative
response.
(1) Common Geometry Theory
Consider the following example: sup-
pose an individual has an innate
concept of a three-dimensional round
object labeled sphere. We know
that mathematically, sphere may be
defined as a set of points in space
that are equal-distant from an arbi-
trary point. Notice that sphere is an
abstract concept that is not bound
to any particular sensory modal-
ity, although it can be mapped to
visual, tactile, and perhaps even
3Experimentally differentiating theories 1 and 2 is
complex and beyond the scope of this report.
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an auditory representation given
sufficient perceptual experience. The
crucial feature that distinguishes this
theory from most empiricist frame-
works is that the innate concept guides
perception in such a way that experi-
ence gradually allows one to map
sensations to an inborn primitive or
idea, and not the other way around.
This may perhaps best be illustrated
in the following way. Most individuals
have an intuitive notion of the con-
cept sphere; however, will they be able
to distinguish a sphere from another
object using auditory cues, such as
through reverberation and shadow
effects, without sufficient experience?
The answer is probably “no.” This is
not because one lacks fundamental
knowledge of “sphereness,” but rather,
because that knowledge is inacces-
sible in a specific modality without
sufficient practice (even though this
hypothetical individual was born with
normal hearing!).
It is therefore straightforward to see
why this version of nativism pre-
dicts a negative answer to Molyneux’s
Question. On one hand, abstract
knowledge of specific events or objects
might be present prior to experience,
be they spoken language or spheres.
However, that knowledge can only
be associated by a specific sensory
modality through experience.
(2) Domain Specific Modular Theory
Onemight easily propose an amended
version to the theory above that also
fails predict an affirmative response.
Suppose that besides the innateness
of concepts, we make the additional
assumption that certain phenomena,
such as spoken language, are innately
bound to or otherwise associated with
a specific modality through some sort
of module. According to this position,
language and phoneme perception
might be thought of a modular audi-
tory function (e.g., Chomsky and
Halle, 1968) while other functions
could be subsumed by tactile or
visual-based modules (e.g., letter per-
ception) that engage automatically
when provided with domain specific
inputs (Fodor, 1983).
As it currently stands, this nativist the-
ory also predicts a “no” answer to
Molyneux’s Question. That is, unless
we make at least one further assump-
tion of an automatic mechanism that
translates the information into a com-
mon code subsequent to auditory
(or visual) perceptual coding. To see
exactly why, consider the case of the
McGurk effect in which an auditory
/ba/ is dubbed over a visually articu-
lated “ga” (McGurk and MacDonald,
1976). The visual “ga” causes the
auditory phoneme /b/ to be assim-
ilated to a phonemic category that
shares a similarmanner of articulation
as /b/, while sharing a similar place
of articulation as the viseme “ga.”
The perception is typically “da” or
“tha” in normal-hearing adults. The
important thing is that the associa-
tion of auditory information to lip
movements is not innate since the
visual perceptual mechanisms do not
have immediate access to auditory
modular outputs. The prediction is
that someone born blind and sud-
denly has their sight restored will hear
“ba” regardless of the lip-movements
it accompanies. One may use anal-
ogous reasoning to understand why
a congenitally blind individual with
restored vision should be able to iden-
tify an object, say a sphere, through
the tactile modality while remaining
unable to automatically associate it
with visual information.
(3) Common Code Theory
I argue that in order for Molyneux’s
Question to be answered with a
“yes,” one further assumption must
be made. An implicit yet fundamen-
tal assumption must be that multi-
sensory perception involves either the
innate representation of objects across
modalities, or perhaps the automatic
translation of object representations
into a common code across modal-
ities. Thus, recognition must occur
through or representations must be
translated into a common amodal
code (e.g., dynamic events or ges-
tures). This appears to be exactly what
the “intermodal feature binding the-
ory” reviewed by Connolly (2014)
as well as Gibsonian theories and
related theories of direct perception
typically assume. In speech percep-
tion, the dynamic event is perceived,
such as the gesture producing “ba”
or “ga,” rather than an auditory code
or discretized phoneme. As such, /ba/
and visual “ga” are encoded as ges-
tural events regardless of the sensory
modality through which the infor-
mation is obtained. The association
between auditory and visual speech
events naturally occurs through an
automatic binding process since the
perceptual event exists in a com-
mon code across modalities in the
first place. Per Molyneux’s Question,
a person born blind with sight sud-
denly restored should have the capa-
bility of identifying a sphere through
vision alone. This is because the tac-
tile code and information accrued
through vision subside in an amodal
format.
PREDICTIONS
Empirically testing Molyneux’s Question
is not straightforward. A recent exam-
ination, for instance, was carried out
using congenitally blind participants
who had their sight restored and testing
them on their ability to match sight to
touch (Held et al., 2011). Participants
failed to match 3D objects to tactile
representations prompting the authors
to suspect a probable “no” answer to
Molyneux’s Question. One potential
shortcoming of Held et al.’s (2011) study
was that the newly sighted may have
poor visual representations of depth cues
(cf. Connolly, 2013; Schwenkler, 2013).
This led Connolly (2013) and Schwenkler
(2013) to discuss the possibility of re-
running the experiment using raised
line-drawings rather than 3D objects. I
agree that this is a viable improvement,
although argue below that other predic-
tions for the newly sighted can likewise
get to the theoretical core of Molyneux’s
Question.
Figure 1 shows a diagram of predic-
tions for categorizing the three nativist
theories of perception. First, if the percep-
tual primitives of auditory, visual, and tac-
tile sensory encoding are coded as amodal
gestures, as in Common Code Theory,
then encoding of incoming information
should be fast, efficient, and form holis-
tic units. This fast and efficient process-
ing strategy is sometimes referred to as
“coactivation.” It can be assessed using
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FIGURE 1 | Predictions and features of the three nativist frameworks of multimodal perception.
speeded recognition detection paradigms
that manipulate perceptual workload by
varying the number of modalities present
in a display (cf. Altieri and Townsend,
2011, for an example in audiovisual inte-
gration). An additional prediction is an
“innate” ability to associate cross-modal
events—for example, the prediction that
the newly sighted, or infants should per-
ceive the McGurk effect (Rosenblum et al.,
1997).
The two nativist theories predicting
a negative response diverge in their pre-
dictions regarding the McGurk effect and
multisensory processing strategy (coac-
tive, vs. parallel or serial). The difference
in prediction lies in the fact that the
first theory allows for an innate associ-
ation mechanism across modalities. While
theory 2, for example, allows for a uni-
versal grammar on phonemic perception
assessable through the auditory modality
(or visual in congenitally deaf individu-
als), the association between modalities
must still be learned. Therefore, the
McGurk effect should not be present in
the newly sighted but become observed
with an increasingly higher probability
over time. Information must be processed
separately in parallel auditory and visual
processing channels, although cross-
modal connections strengthen through
learning. These theories also predict par-
allel rather than coactive processing; an
observation reported in neurocognitive
multimodal speech studies (Altieri and
Wenger, 2013).
In conclusion, this article discussed
some limitations in differentiating learned
association theories from nativist ones
from the perspective of Molyneux’s
Question. This paper did not aim to
promote one framework over another,
although it did illustrate how Molyneux’s
Question can prove beneficial for sort-
ing out questions concerning finer
grained theories of intermodal binding.
Clearer discussion on theories of mul-
timodal binding is especially important
in light of continued advances in per-
ceptual sciences alongside neuro-imaging
technology.
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